TWO-STAGE HASH BASED LOGIC FOR APPLICATION LAYER DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDoS) ATTACK ATTRIBUTION

ABSTRACT

Methods and systems for a two-stage attribution of application layer DDoS attack are provided. In a first table just a hash index is maintained whereas the second stage table keeps the string parameter corresponding to the application layer attribute under attack. A linked list maintains a plurality of rows if there is hash collision in the first table. The second table is aged out and reported periodically with details of large strings.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED PATENTS

This application may relate to the subject matter of U.S. Pat. No.7,426,634 entitled, “Method and apparatus for rate based denial ofservice attack detection and prevention”, U.S. Pat. No. 7,602,731entitled “System and method for integrated header, state, rate andcontent anomaly prevention with policy enforcement”, and U.S. Pat. No.7,626,940 entitled “System and method for integrated header, state, rateand content anomaly prevention for domain name service” all of which arehereby incorporated by reference in their entirety for all purposes.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE

Contained herein is material that is subject to copyright protection.The copyright owner has no objection to the facsimile reproduction ofthe patent disclosure by any person as it appears in the Patent andTrademark Office patent files or records, but otherwise reserves allrights to the copyright whatsoever. Copyright © 2015, Fortinet, Inc.

FIELD

Embodiments of the present invention relate generally to network andcomputer security. In particular embodiments of the present inventionrelate to methods for the prevention of distributed denial of service(DDoS) attacks on Internet infrastructure.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BACKGROUND ART

DDoS attacks vary. The parameters for DDoS attacks vary. However, in aDDoS attack, the important part, from the viewpoint of a networkadministrator, and therefore a mitigation appliance, is to find what'scommon among the barrage of packets that are reaching the destinationnetwork. This is being referred to as attribution of the attack. Networkand transport layer DDoS attacks can be attributed easily. An example ofnetwork layer DDoS attacks is one on Internet Protocol Secure (IPSec)protocol, where all attack packets, though coming from multiple IPaddresses, have the same IP Protocol number, namely 50, corresponding toIPSec. Protocol 50 identifies the type of protocol used to attack andcan be rate-limited while everything else flows unaltered. An example ofa transport layer DDoS attack is an attack on User Datagram Protocol(UDP) port 3000. In this case, the common attribute for all attackpackets is UDP port 3000. Such numbered attributes are easy to identifyand report and do not heavily increase the memory table capacity whilemonitoring because numbers take a limited number of bytes to store.

Application layer Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks are becomingcommonplace. DDoS attack mitigation of application layer attacksrequires ability to identify the attacks more specifically. An exampleof application layer attacks is one on the Hypertext Transfer Protocol(HTTP) protocol, where all attack packets, though coming from multipleIP addresses, have the same user-agent. The user-agent identifies thetype of browser or script used to access the page under attack. Thestrings which identify user-agents vary in sizes. These could vary froma few bytes to few hundred of bytes. An example of Apple iPhone's useragent for a specific version is “Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 5_0like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/534.46 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/5.1Mobile/9A334 Safari/7534.48.3”. As yet another example, Firefox browserversion 42.0 on Windows 10, has a user-agent, “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT10.0; WOW64; rv:42.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/42.0”. In a similar way,other attributes which identify a specific attack include host, referer,cookie, Uniform Resource Locator (URL), etc. Most of these are variablelength strings and may sometimes be very large in length. An exemplaryURL on the Amazon.com website for Star Wars blu-ray is“/Star-Trilogy-Episodes-IV-VI-Blu-ray/dp/B00E9PMMX0/ref=sr_1_1”.Sometimes further strings are added to this URL to identify furtherdetails of the users who are accessing them or the search query that ledto the access of the URL.

In application layer DDoS attacks, a security administrator would likean appliance to attribute these attacks to a specific user-agent, host,referer, URL etc. Current methods of DDoS attack reporting do not havethe speed and processing power to instantly and correctly identify thesevariable length strings, especially if they don't fit in a few bytes.For example, if an attack script has been written only for a specificdevice, all attack packets will have the same user-agent. If the samescript has been distributed by a hacker to a network to create a botnet,they may all have the same user-agent even though coming from differentIP addresses. Therefore during mitigation, it makes sense to simplyblock packets coming with that specific user-agent and leave all othertraffic unaffected. The same can be done for attacks written for aspecific URL, specific Host, with specific Referer etc. Clearly, a newmethod is needed to attribute DDoS attacks to large variable size commonparameter strings in real-time under high volume application layer DDoSattacks. The purpose of such attribution is to facilitate dropping ofall subsequently received packets with common parameters to avoid falsepositives and/or to track sources that send such packets and block thosesource IP addresses.

SUMMARY

Methods and systems are described for a two-stage solution to theattribution of DDoS attacks specifically at the application layer.According to one embodiment, a method of grouping a series of DDoSattacks based on a hash of the monitored string is provided. Thesestrings correspond to application layer items such as URL, host, cookie,user-agent, referer etc. The size of the hash index is limited—typicallyunder 32 bits. The second stage then refines the attribution by becomingmore specific to only attacked parameters. The scheme works because alarge number of hash indexes need to be monitored but only a limitednumber of hash indexes are under attack at a given time. The attackstatus for each of the monitored hashes is determined by comparing, bythe DDoS detection module, granular traffic rates directed to themonitored hashes to corresponding adaptive thresholds. When a granulartraffic rate for a particular monitored hash is determined to exceed itscorresponding adaptive threshold, a host computer is notified by theDDoS detection module of the attack status for the particular monitoredhash.

Other features of embodiments of the present disclosure will be apparentfrom accompanying drawings and from detailed description that follows.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a block diagram conceptually illustrating a DDoS mitigationsystem according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram conceptually illustrating a layer 7 granularrate anomaly meter according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 3 is a flow diagram illustrating a general process of two stagelayer 7 granular rate threshold monitoring in accordance with anembodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 4 illustrates a flow diagram illustrating a detailed process of twostage layer 7 granular rate in accordance with an embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 5 is an exemplary computer system in which or with whichembodiments of the present invention may be utilized.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Methods and systems are described for attribution of application layerDDoS attacks. According to one embodiment, a DDoS attack mitigationmodule comprises an apparatus that allows granular thresholds to be setfor multiple layer 3, 4 or 7 parameters. Once a traffic threshold isbreached, the specific parameter is rate limited or identified for aspecific treatment. The parameter may be a simple number such as aprotocol, port in which case attribution is direct—i.e. no furtherdetails are required. Complexity arises when the parameter is a variablelength and possibly a long length string. In one embodiment, a hashbased indexing scheme is used to convert the strings to hash index andstore the threshold, rates and drop counts. Since the depth of the tablecan be very large—e.g., 1 M entries, any increase in the width of thetable is expensive in terms of memory storage, access and retrieval. Forexample, if the maximum expected length of a parameter (e.g., a URL) is1024 characters, then the width of the table has to be increased toaccommodate such width. Thus if the hash table depth is 1 M entries, anadditional 1 Gbytes of memory would be needed for such strings. Such achoice is wasteful because not all URLs are under attack at a giventime.

In a simplistic solution, the designer can either show first 16 bytes,last 16 bytes or some 16 bytes of the long string. This is sub-optimaland not very useful. Thus if the hash table depth is 1 M entries, anadditional 16 Mbytes of memory is needed for incomplete strings.

The logic described herein provides a way to store a large set ofstrings but not for every entry in the hash table. This is achievedusing a two-stage implementation wherein a secondary table is used foronly entries that have a non-zero drop count—i.e., parameters underattack.

According to one embodiment, the purpose of the attribution logic is todetermine the instantaneous application layer parameter under attack. Itdoes this via storing the granular packet rates in a granular meteringmemory. Rate anomaly meters inside the packet processing logic receiveclassifier output and maintain the instantaneous packet-rates andcompare them against the thresholds set adaptively and continuously bythe controlling host.

An object of various embodiments of the present invention is to providea high-rate method suitable for hardware logic of attributing attacks toan application layer parameter.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a DDoS mitigation system 100 in accordancewith an embodiment of the present invention. DDoS mitigation system 100includes a packet interface 102, a packet buffer 211, a packetprocessing logic 208, a granular metering memory 113 and a hostinterface 209.

When packets are received, packet interface 102 buffers them in a packetbuffer 211 and serially releases them to the subsequent logic.

When packet processing logic 208 receives traffic flow packets frompacket interface 105, packet processing logic 208 uses a granularmetering memory 113 to calculate and derive granular packet rates and todetermine if there are any threshold violations. In one embodiment,granular metering memory 113 may be partially inside aField-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)/Application-Specific IntegratedCircuit (ASIC) based board and large blocks of memory may be external,for example, in a Double Data Rate (DDR) memory or Quad Data Rate (QDR)Memory. According to one embodiment, a host computer can read thegranular packet rate parameters via host interface 209. Those skilled inthe art will appreciate a variety of alternative interfaces may be used.Host computer can similarly set the granular packet rate thresholdsbased on past behavior for that granular rate parameter.

Layer 2 classifier 105 receives frames and classifies packets based ontheir layer 2 characteristics and ensures that it is a supported layer 2packet (e.g., an Ethernet 802.3 frame). Layer 2 classifier 105 alsoparses the layer 2 headers and passes that information to subsequentlogic blocks over a classification bus 109. In an exemplary embodimentof this invention, layer 2 classifier 105 block can parse Ethernetframes and IEEE 802.2/3 frames and can determine Address ResolutionProtocol (ARP), Reverse ARP (RARP), broadcast, Internet Protocol (IP),multicast, non-IP, virtual local are network (VLAN) tagged frames, anddouble encapsulated VLAN tagged frames.

Layer 3 classifier 106 receives packet data as well as layer 2classifier information from layer 2 classifier 105. Layer 3 classifier106 extracts the layer 3 header information in IP version 4 (IPv4) andIP version 6 (IPv6) headers and passes it on to the subsequent logicover classification bus 109. In some embodiments, layer 3 classifier 106parses IPv4 and IPv6 packets and determines properties, including, butnot limited to, type of service (TOS), IP Options, fragmentation, andprotocol.

Layer 4 classifier 107, similarly, parses the layer 4 information frompackets that are guaranteed to be in order with respect tofragmentation. In an exemplary embodiment, this classifier looks atTransmission Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP),Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), IPSec—Encapsulating SecurityPayload (ESP), and IPSec—Authentication Header (AH). This information ispassed to the subsequent blocks over classification bus 109. In anexemplary embodiment of this invention, this classifier can parse layer4 information, including, but not limited to, TCP Options, TCP ports,UDP Ports, ICMP types/codes, TCP flags, sequence numbers, ACK numbersand the like. Packets that are anomalous may be dropped.

Layer 7 classifier 108, similarly, parses the layer 7 information frompackets. In an exemplary embodiment, this classifier looks at TCP, UDPpackets and parses layer 7 traffic flow statistics from protocols,including, but not limited to, NetFlow, sFlow, jFlow and CFlow. Thisinformation is passed to the subsequent blocks over classification bus109.

Layer 3 rate anomaly meter 110 utilizes the output of layer 3 classifier106 and derives layer 3 granular rates for identified destinations andenforces layer 3 granular rate thresholds based thereon.

Layer 4 rate anomaly meter 111 utilizes the output of layer 4 classifier107 and derives layer 4 granular rates for identified destinations andenforces layer 4 granular rate thresholds based thereon. The process ofenforcing layer 4 granular rate will be described further below withreference to Table 1.

Layer 7 rate anomaly meter 112 utilizes the output of layer 7 classifierlogic 108 and derives layer 7 granular rates for identified destinationsand enforces layer 7 granular rate thresholds based thereon. Inembodiments of the present invention, layer 7 rate anomaly meter 112 isa two-stage layer 7 rate anomaly meter as described in further detailbelow with reference to FIGS. 2 and 3.

Layer 4 rate anomaly meter 111 may use a table, such as Table 1, totrack the rate of each port that is monitored by the meter 111.

TABLE 1 Threshold - Current Rate - TCP Port Packets/secondPackets/second Drop count this period 0 3000 1000 1200 20000 4000 500300 0 . . .

Table 1 depicts an exemplary table for tracking the layer 4 drops formonitoring TCP port floods. In this exemplary table, the depth of thetable is 65536 (corresponding to known TCP ports). Each row has an index(which may be implicit), a threshold in terms of packets per second,current rate in terms of packets per second and drop count in a periodunder observation. In this exemplary situation, when a port such as port3000 has a high packet rate above the set threshold, the mitigationlogic can start dropping the packets and counting them. These drops canbe very easily attributed to port 3000 as it is an implicit index of therow. The name and number of columns are only for explaining theconcepts. In a practical implementation, there may be more columns andcorresponding data.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram conceptually illustrating a two-stage layer 7granular rate anomaly meter 200 according to an embodiment of thepresent invention. Layer 7 granular rate anomaly meter 200 can be usedas layer 7 meter 112 of FIG. 1. In the present example, layer 7 granularrate anomaly meter 200 include a stage 1 meter 201, a stage 1 table 202,a stage 2 meter 203, a stage 2 table 204 and an ager logic 205.

Stage 1 meter 201 is used for tracking rates of accesses to HTTP URLsthat are hosted by a server protected by a DDoS mitigation system. Thenumber of URLs that are monitored by meter 200 can be very large, e.g.,over one million URLs. Meanwhile, a URL can be a long string, e.g., 1Kbytes. Therefore, it would be very expensive in term of memory usage,access and retrieval if the full URLs were to be kept in a table withinthe memory of meter 200. For example, if the maximum expected length ofa layer 7 attribute (e.g., a URL) is 1024 characters, then the width ofthe table would have to be increased to accommodate such width. Such achoice is wasteful because not all URLs are under attack at a giventime. Thus if the stage 1 table's depth is 1 M entries, an additional 1Gbytes of memory would be needed for such full URLs. Therefore, inaccordance with embodiments of the present invention, a digest of theURLs, e.g., first hash values, are maintained in the stage 1 tableinstead of the full URLs. The first hash values are calculated based ona first hash algorithm and have a limited length, e.g., 20 bits. Stage 1meter 201 tracks traffic rates of the first hash values and determinesif a URL is under attack by comparing the traffic rates withcorresponding thresholds. Table 2 shows an example of stage 1 table 202that is used by stage 1 meter 201.

TABLE 2 URL Current URLs Used Hash Threshold Rate Drop Drop (forexplanation Flag Index Packets/s Packets/s count count only) 0 0 1 100010000 100 0 /safe.html /noproblems.html . . . 1 1022 1000 1200 20000 3/underattack.html /victim.html . . . 1 1054 2000 4000 300000 5/attacked.html /flooded.html 1 1055 500 300 0 /index.php /lowrate.html .. .

Table 2 depicts an exemplary stage 1 table for tracking the applicationlayer attacks on HTTP URLs according to an embodiment of the presentinvention. Unlike a port, a URL is a variable size string and to monitorit, a first hash is used. The first hash is generated from the stringand used as an index. Each row of the table is then implicitly indexedby the hash index. The hash index can vary from 0 to 2̂n−1 where n is thenumber of bits in the first hash. According to one embodiment, each rowhas columns including but not limited to an index (which may beimplicit), a threshold in terms of packets per second, current rate interms of packets per second and drop count in a period underobservation. In an exemplary situation, a protected entity has many URLswhich can be accessed from the Internet. These include /safe.html,/noproblems.html, /underattack.html, /victim.html, /attacked.html,/flooded.html, /index.php, and lowrate.html. As can be seen in Table 2,some of these are exceeding the set threshold (under attack) and someare below threshold (not under attack). In this example, both the firsthash values of URLs of /safe.html and /noproblems.html are 1000 due tothe length limit of the first hash value. Both the first hash values ofURLs of /underattack.html and /victim.html are 1022. Both the first hashvalues of URLs of /attacked.html and /flooded.html are 1054. Both thefirst hash values of URLs of /index.php, and /lowrate.html are 1055. Forexplanation purpose, a “URL” column is added to Table 2 to show thecorresponding of first values and URLs. In one embodiment of the presentinvention, one URL is stored at stage 1 table.

One goal of embodiments of the present invention is to be able toidentify and report the actual strings (e.g., /underattack.html,/flooded.html etc). In most cases, such strings may be large length—say1K bytes or more.

According to an embodiment of this invention, application layerattributes can be converted to a hash using algorithms including but notlimited to the MD5 message-digest algorithm, a Secure Hash Algorithm(e.g., SHA-0, SHA-1, SHA-2 and Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) (e.g.,CRC32). The depth of this table depends on the number of bits in thehash. For example, if the hash has 20 bits, the table can have 1 Mentries. In an exemplary embodiment, the table is implemented withoutlinked lists—thus if there is a hash collision due to two stringshashing to the same location in the table, the two strings may betreated the same for the purpose of rates. Since the thresholds arelearned based on the same scheme, the behavior remains correct andthresholds cover multiple strings colliding in the same location.According to an embodiment, the two strings are attributed separately inthe second stage if there is an attack on the same hash index.

In one embodiment, when there are non-zero drops due to the traffic fora hash-index crossing the thresholds, stage 2 meter 203 may be used todetect the exact URL that is under attack by tracking the attack in astage 2 table as depicted in Table 3.

TABLE 3 Index (Im- Used URL URL plicit) Flag Hash1 Hash2 URL Drop countLink 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 1 1022 0x1234 /underattack.html 15000 4 4 1 10220x4321 /victim.html 5000 0 5 1 1054 0x3456 /flooded.html 2000000 6 6 11054 0x6789 /attacked.html 1000000 0 . . .

Table 3 depicts an exemplary stage 2 table for attribution for trackingthe application layer attacks on HTTP URLs according to an embodiment ofthe present invention. In one embodiment, in this table, entries arecreated only when there are drops found for a URL in the stage 1 tableas shown in Table 2. Stage 2 table creates a unique entry for each firsthash index in Table 2 under attack. If there are multiple attributesthat collide in Table 2, the second hash values of the URLs that aredetermined to be under attack by stage 1 meter are calculated based on asecond hash algorithm. The second hash values are created as a linkedlist in Table 3. As an example /underattack.html and /victim.html bothhave the same first hash value in Table 2, in Table 3 they are spreadout as two entries—row 3 and row 4. To achieve this, a new hash scheme(hash 2) is used to calculate the second hash of the string. The secondhash is written as an attribute in the column (URL Hash2). If a stringhash 2 doesn't match with what's already in the corresponding row, a newrow is created and linked to the existing row. The link can be thecolliding first hash value stored as an index at the second hash tableas shown in Table 3. Such extension through linkage is carried out untilthere are no collisions.

At the end of the blocking period, which according to an embodiment,ager logic 205 goes through stage 2 table 204 to remove the entries fromthe stage 2 table. A report module 207 may report the rows with detailsof the complete URL and frees the entries so that they can be used inthe next cycle of blocking. This blocking period may be user-defined andaccording to one embodiment can range from between from 0 to 15 seconds.

FIG. 3 is a flow diagram illustrating a general process of two stagelayer 7 granular rate threshold monitoring in accordance with anembodiment of the present invention.

At block 301, a DDoS detection module of a network receives informationregarding multiple application layer attributes. The informationregarding application layer attributes may be collected by a layer 7classifier from data packets of network traffic going through a network.The information regarding application layer may include the first hashvalues of application layer attributes, e.g., URLs, that are hosted byone or more host computers. The first hash values of the monitoredapplication layer attributes are calculated based on a first hashalgorithm and the length of the first hash values may be limited inorder that a stage 1 table containing all monitored hash values may bestored in the memory of DDoS detection module. The DDoS detection modulemonitors the first hash values to determine if the URLs are underattack.

At block 302, the DDoS detection module determines an attack status foreach of the monitored attributes by comparing granular traffic ratesdirected to the first hash value of each of the monitored attributes tocorresponding adaptive thresholds. When a granular traffic rate for thea particular first hash value of a particular monitored attribute ofmultiple monitored attributes of the granular traffic rates isdetermined to exceed an adaptive threshold for the particular monitoredattribute, then the particular monitored attribute is determined to bean under-attack attribute.

At block 303, when a first hash value is determined to be under attack,the details of the under attack layer 7 attribute is stored within astage 2 table in the memory. In embodiments of the present invention,detailed information regarding the layer 7 attributes may be stored inmemory at stage 2 of the layer 7 DDoS detection only when they aredetermined to be under attacked at stage 1 of layer 7 DDoS detection.Because the number of layer 7 attributes that are currently under attackis much smaller as compared to the number of all the monitored layer 7attributes, the depth of stage 2 table is much less than that of stage 1table and the details of under attack layer 7 attributes, e.g., the fullURLs, can be easily stored, accessed and managed within stage 2 table inmemory.

When the first hash value is not long enough and hash collisions arelikely to occur, a second hash value of the attribute that is determinedto be under attack at the first stage may be calculated in order todetermine if the attribute is a victim attribute due to the collision ofthe first hash values. The process of stage 2 DDoS detection isdescribed further below with reference to FIG. 4.

At block 304, the layer 7 DDoS detection module may notify a hostcomputer coupled to the DDoS detection module of the attack statustogether with the detail of for the under attack attribute stored withinstage 2 table in memory.

At block 305, the DDoS detection module may rate limit the trafficdestined for the particular identified attribute so that the rest of thetraffic which is not destined for this attribute goes unaffected. Thedetails of operation of blocks 304 and 305 are well known in the art,therefore detailed descriptions thereof are omitted for sake of brevity.

FIG. 4 is a flow diagram illustrating a detailed process of stage 2layer 7 DDoS detection in accordance with an embodiment of the presentinvention. In the present example, a first hash value is determined tobe under attack by a layer 7 DDoS detection module at stage 1 and astage 2 DDoS detection is used for reporting details of the under attackattributes.

At block 401, a layer 7 DDoS detection module stores detailedinformation regarding an attribute corresponding to an under attackfirst hash value within a stage 2 table in a memory of the DDoSdetection module at stage 2 of the layer 7 DDoS detection. The detailedinformation may include a URL that is under attack.

At block 402, the layer 7 DDoS detection module may calculate a secondhash value of the attribute corresponding to the under attack first hashvalue. When the first hash value of two or more attributes collide duethe length limit of the first hash value, second hash values of thecollided attributes may be calculated based on a second hash algorithm.The second hash values of the collided attributes do not collide becausethe second hash algorithm is different from the first hash algorithm.The collided attributes in stage 1 DDoS detection may be distinguishedby the second hash values at the stage 2 of the layer 7 DDoS detection.The second hash values of collided attributes may be stored in a stage 2table as a link of the colliding first hash value. For example, a “hash2” column of Table 3 is used for storing the second hash values of underattack attributes that collide in the stage 1 DDoS detection.

At block 403, the layer 7 DDoS detection module may calculate a dropcount of the second hash value to further determine if a layer 7attribute that is dropped at stage 1 of DDoS detection is a victimattribute due to the hash collision. For example, a “drop count” columnof Table 3 is used for recording the granular traffic rate of the secondhash value. In Table 2, a first hash value “1022” is dropped 20,000times at stage 1 of the layer 7 DDoS detection. However, the first hashvalue “1022” is colliding for two URLs “/underattack.html” and“/victim.html”. Therefore, both of the two colliding URLs are dropped atstage 1. At stage 2, the second hash values of the colliding URLs aredistinguished by the second hash values “0x1234” and “0x4321” and thedrop rate of the second hash values are calculated separately. In thisexample, the second hash value “0x1234” is counted 15000 times at stage2 of the layer 7 DDoS detection and the second hash value “0x4321” iscounted 5000 times at stage 2.

At block 404, the layer 7 DDoS detection module may check if the droppedattributes at stage 1 are really under attack or victims due to hashcollision by comparing drop count of second hash values with thresholds.If a drop count of a second hash value is higher than a threshold, theattribute corresponding to the second hash value is really under attackbecause the access rate of the attribute are actually higher than normalusage. If the drop count is lower than the threshold, the attributecorresponding to the second hash value is a victim because the accessrate of the attribute is lower than normal usage but it is dropped bythe layer 7 DDoS detection module.

At block 405, an ager of the layer 7 DDoS detection module may scan thestage 2 table in the memory and remove the entries which are not in usefor a period from the tables at block 406.

At block 407, the ager may report the attack status together withdetails of attributes stored in stage 2 table. As the entries of stage 2table are limited, details of under-attack attributes stored in stage 2table may include all the information that are need for reporting thelayer 7 DDoS attacks, such as the URLs in full length. The report mayalso include status of an attribute, such as under-attack, flooded orvictim.

FIG. 5 is an example of a computer system 500 with which embodiments ofthe present disclosure may be utilized. Computer system 500 mayrepresent or form a part of a network appliance, a server or a clientworkstation.

Embodiments of the present disclosure include various steps, which willbe described in more detail below. A variety of these steps may beperformed by hardware components or may be tangibly embodied on acomputer-readable storage medium in the form of machine-executableinstructions, which may be used to cause a general-purpose orspecial-purpose processor programmed with instructions to perform thesesteps. Alternatively, the steps may be performed by a combination ofhardware, software, and/or firmware.

As shown, computer system 500 includes a bus 530, a processor 505,communication port 510, a main memory 515, a removable storage media540, a read only memory 520 and a mass storage 525. A person skilled inthe art will appreciate that computer system 500 may include more thanone processor and communication ports.

Examples of processor 505 include, but are not limited to, an Intel®Itanium® or Itanium 2 processor(s), or AMD® Opteron® or Athlon MP®processor(s), Motorola® lines of processors, FortiSOC™ system on a chipprocessors or other future processors. Processor 505 may include variousmodules associated with embodiments of the present invention.

Communication port 510 can be any of an RS-232 port for use with a modembased dialup connection, a 10/100 Ethernet port, a Gigabit or 10 Gigabitport using copper or fiber, a serial port, a parallel port, or otherexisting or future ports. Communication port 510 may be chosen dependingon a network, such a Local Area Network (LAN), Wide Area Network (WAN),or any network to which computer system 500 connects.

Memory 515 can be Random Access Memory (RAM), or any other dynamicstorage device commonly known in the art. Read only memory 520 can beany static storage device(s) such as, but not limited to, a ProgrammableRead Only Memory (PROM) chips for storing static information such asstart-up or BIOS instructions for processor 505.

Mass storage 525 may be any current or future mass storage solution,which can be used to store information and/or instructions. Exemplarymass storage solutions include, but are not limited to, ParallelAdvanced Technology Attachment (PATA) or Serial Advanced TechnologyAttachment (SATA) hard disk drives or solid-state drives (internal orexternal, e.g., having Universal Serial Bus (USB) and/or Firewireinterfaces), such as those available from Seagate (e.g., the SeagateBarracuda 7200 family) or Hitachi (e.g., the Hitachi Deskstar 7K1000),one or more optical discs, Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID)storage, such as an array of disks (e.g., SATA arrays), available fromvarious vendors including Dot Hill Systems Corp., LaCie, NexsanTechnologies, Inc. and Enhance Technology, Inc.

Bus 530 communicatively couples processor(s) 505 with the other memory,storage and communication blocks. Bus 530 can be, such as a PeripheralComponent Interconnect (PCI)/PCI Extended (PCI-X) bus, Small ComputerSystem Interface (SCSI), USB or the like, for connecting expansioncards, drives and other subsystems as well as other buses, such a frontside bus (FSB), which connects processor 505 to system memory.

Optionally, operator and administrative interfaces, such as a display,keyboard, and a cursor control device, may also be coupled to bus 530 tosupport direct operator interaction with computer system 500. Otheroperator and administrative interfaces can be provided through networkconnections connected through communication port 510.

Removable storage media 540 can be any kind of external hard-drives,floppy drives, IOMEGA® Zip Drives, Compact Disc-Read Only Memory(CD-ROM), Compact Disc-Re-Writable (CD-RW), Digital Video Disk-Read OnlyMemory (DVD-ROM).

Components described above are meant only to exemplify variouspossibilities. In no way should the aforementioned exemplary computersystem limit the scope of the present disclosure.

Embodiments of the present disclosure include various steps, which havebeen described above. A variety of these steps may be performed byhardware components or may be tangibly embodied on a computer-readablestorage medium in the form of machine-executable instructions, which maybe used to cause a general-purpose or special-purpose processorprogrammed with instructions to perform these steps. Alternatively, thesteps may be performed by a combination of hardware, software, and/orfirmware.

Although embodiments of the present invention and their variousadvantages have been described in detail, it should be understood thatthe present invention is not limited to or defined by what is shown ordiscussed herein.

Moreover, as one skilled in the art will appreciate, any digitalcomputer systems can be configured or otherwise programmed to implementthe methods and apparatuses disclosed herein, and to the extent that aparticular digital computer system is configured to implement themethods and apparatuses described herein, it is within the scope andspirit of the present invention. Once a digital computer system isprogrammed to perform particular functions pursuant tocomputer-executable instructions from program software that implementsembodiments of the present invention, it in effect becomes a specialpurpose computer. The techniques necessary to achieve this are wellknown to those skilled in the art and thus are not further describedherein.

Computer executable instructions implementing the methods and techniquesdescribed herein can be distributed to users on a computer-readablemedium and are often copied onto a hard disk or other storage medium.When such a program of instructions is to be executed, it is usuallyloaded into the random access memory of the computer, therebyconfiguring the computer to act in accordance with the techniquesdisclosed herein. All these operations are well known to those skilledin the art and thus are not further described herein. The term“computer-readable medium” encompasses distribution media, intermediatestorage media, execution memory of a computer, and any other medium ordevice capable of storing for later reading by a computer a computerprogram implementing embodiments of the present invention.

Accordingly, drawings, tables, and description disclosed hereinillustrate technologies related to the invention, show examples ofembodiments of the invention, and provide examples of using embodimentsof the invention and are not to be construed as limiting the presentinvention. Known methods, techniques, or systems may be discussedwithout giving details, so to avoid obscuring the principles of theinvention. As it will be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in theart, the present invention can be implemented, modified, or otherwisealtered without departing from the principles and spirit of the presentinvention. Therefore, the scope of the present invention should bedetermined by the following claims and their legal equivalents.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprising: receiving, by a distributeddenial of service (DDoS) detection module within a network, informationregarding a plurality of application layer attributes for which anattack status is to be monitored; determining the attack status for eachof the plurality of monitored attributes by comparing, by the DDoSdetection module, granular traffic rates directed to a first hash valueof each of the plurality of monitored attributes to a plurality ofcorresponding adaptive thresholds, wherein the first hash value iscalculated based on a first hash algorithm; when a granular traffic ratefor a first hash value of a particular monitored attribute of theplurality of monitored attributes exceeds an adaptive threshold for theparticular monitored attribute, the particular monitored attribute isdetermined to be an under-attack attribute; storing, by the DDoS monitormodule, details regarding the under-attack attribute in a memory of theDDoS detection module; and notifying, by the DDoS detection module, ahost computer coupled to the DDoS detection module of the attack statusand the details of the under-attack attribute.
 2. The method of claim 1,further comprising: storing, by the DDoS monitor module, the first hashvalue of each of the plurality of monitored attributes in a first stagetable in the memory; storing, by the DDoS monitor module, the details ofthe under-attack attribute in a second stage table in the memory afterthe under-attack attribute is determined.
 3. The method of claim 2,further comprising: calculating, by the DDoS monitor module, a secondhash value of the under-attack attribute based on a second hashalgorithm; calculating, by the DDoS monitor module, a drop count for thesecond hash value of the under-attack attribute.
 4. The method of claim3, further comprising when the drop count for the second hash value ofthe under-attack attribute does not exceed an adaptive threshold for theunder-attack attribute, the under-attack attribute is determined to be avictim attribute.
 5. The method of claim 2, further comprising:scanning, by an ager logic of the DDoS monitor module, the second stagetable; and removing, by the ager logic, an entry from the second stagetable if the entry is not in use within a pre-determined time period. 6.The method of claim 5, further comprising reporting, by the ager logic,the entries of the second stage table with the details of under-attackattributes at an end of a pre-determined blocking period.
 7. The methodof claim 6, wherein the pre-determined blocking period is from 0 to 15seconds.
 8. The method of claim 2, further comprising: when a collisionbetween the first hash value occurs between multiple of the plurality ofmonitored attributes, generating, by the DDoS monitor module, multiplesecond hash values for the multiple monitored attributes; storing, bythe DDoS monitor module, the multiple second hash values of the multiplemonitored attributes within multiple entries of the second stage table;and linking, by the DDoS monitor module, the multiple entries of thesecond hash values with the collided first hash value in the secondstage table.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein the details of theunder-attack attribute comprise a full-length string representing theunder-attack attribute.
 10. The method of claim 1, wherein the firsthash value of each of the plurality of monitored attributes is less than20 bits.
 11. The method of claim 1, wherein the first hash algorithm isselected from any one of MD5, Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), cyclicredundancy check (CRC).
 12. A computer system comprising: non-transitorystorage device having tangibly embodied therein instructionsrepresenting a security application; and one or more processors coupledto the non-transitory storage device and operable to execute thesecurity application to perform a method comprising: receiving, by adistributed denial of service (DDoS) detection module within a network,information regarding a plurality of application layer attributes forwhich an attack status is to be monitored; determining the attack statusfor each of the plurality of monitored attributes by comparing, by theDDoS detection module, granular traffic rates directed to a first hashvalue of each of the plurality of monitored attributes to a plurality ofcorresponding adaptive thresholds, wherein the first hash value iscalculated based on a first hash algorithm; when a granular traffic ratefor a first hash value of a particular monitored attribute of theplurality of monitored attributes exceeds an adaptive threshold for theparticular monitored attribute, the particular monitored attribute isdetermined to be an under-attack attribute; storing, by the DDoS monitormodule, details regarding the under-attack attribute in a memory of theDDoS detection module; and notifying, by the DDoS detection module, ahost computer coupled to the DDoS detection module of the attack statusand the details of the under-attack attribute.
 13. The computer systemof claim 12, wherein the method further comprises: storing, by the DDoSmonitor module, the first hash value of each of the plurality ofmonitored attributes in a first stage table in the memory; storing, bythe DDoS monitor module, the details of the under-attack attribute in asecond stage table in the memory after the under-attack attribute isdetermined.
 14. The computer system of claim 13, wherein the methodfurther comprises: calculating, by the DDoS monitor module, a secondhash value of the under-attack attribute based on a second hashalgorithm; calculating, by the DDoS monitor module, a drop count for thesecond hash value of the under-attack attribute.
 15. The computer systemof claim 14, wherein the method further comprises when the drop countfor the second hash value of the under-attack attribute does not exceedan adaptive threshold for the under-attack attribute, the under-attackattribute is determined to be a victim attribute.
 16. The computersystem of claim 14, wherein the method further comprises: scanning, byan ager logic of the DDoS monitor module, the second stage table; andremoving, by the ager logic, an entry from the second stage table if theentry is not in use within a pre-determined time period.
 17. Thecomputer system of claim 16, wherein the method further comprisesreporting, by the ager logic, the entries of the second stage table withthe details of under-attack attributes at an end of a pre-determinedblocking period.
 18. The computer system of claim 17, wherein thepre-determined blocking period is from 0 to 15 seconds.
 19. The computersystem of claim 13, wherein the method further comprises: when acollision between the first hash value occurs between multiple of theplurality of monitored attributes, generating, by the DDoS monitormodule, multiple second hash values for the multiple monitoredattributes; storing, by the DDoS monitor module, the multiple secondhash values of the multiple monitored attributes within multiple entriesof the second stage table; and linking, by the DDoS monitor module, themultiple entries of the second hash values with the collided first hashvalue in the second stage table.
 20. The computer system of claim 12,wherein the details of the under-attack attribute comprise a full-lengthstring representing the under-attack attribute.
 21. The computer systemof claim 12, wherein the first hash value of each of the plurality ofmonitored attributes is less than 20 bits.
 22. The computer system ofclaim 12, wherein the first hash algorithm is selected from any one ofMD5, Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), cyclic redundancy check (CRC).